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INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides that
private property may not be taken without just
compensation.' But the Takings Clause does not provide
adequate guidance to a court that is struggling to determine
whether the facts involved amount to a taking. In Penn
Central Transportation Company v. City of New York, the
Supreme Court held that the usual test for a regulatory
taking required an ad hoc, factual inquiry.2 The Court
provided only minimal guidance for approaching this inquiry,
by giving examples of the factors that a court should
consider.' The Court has done little to clarify its ad hoc,
multifactor approach since Penn Central. The original
decision still controls this murky area of constitutional
interpretation.4
* A.B. Harvard College; J.D., University of Texas School of Law. John B.
Neibel Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24.
(1978).
3. Id. at 124-28.
4. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523, 529-31 (1992)
(deciding that rent control is not "physical occupation" pursuant to Penn
Central; construing that case as providing the general rule, with such imprecise
[Vol. 52
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Depending upon how they are counted, there are six, or
possibly seven, factors that can be extracted from the Court's
opinion.5 The factors are to be balanced against each other,
but in an unspecified way, and they are only loosely defined.
The Court did not articulate which factors, if any, should be
given more weight. In fact, the Court has never explained the
factors, and surprisingly, neither have the commentators.
Although there is a great deal of literature criticizing the
Penn Central decision, the critics have failed to tell the courts
how to make the factors work rationally, and therefore, the
issue remains as murky today, thirty-three years later. And
so this question-how to consider the balancing factors and
discern whether a regulation has gone too far and become a
taking-is a subject that unfortunately is still an issue today.'
The question is important because a multifactor
balancing test is unavoidably vague.7 Arguably, in the case of
takings by regulation, the law will necessarily be expressed in
a multifactor balancing test, however vague it may be,
because there are too many varieties of takings claims for a
neat and orderly test to be useful. In fact, in Penn Central,
Chief Justice Rehnquist did not provide any alternative to the
Court's mushy, ad hoc approach in his dissent.' He simply
concluded that the Court should have weighed the balancing
factors differently. ' If we knew how the factors should be
weighed, perhaps we could reduce the vagueness of the ad hoc
test, even if we were unlikely to eliminate it. Thus, it is
surprising that the Supreme Court has done so little to refine
the Penn Central approach, even though it is more than thirty
years old and has been the subject of discussion in
phrases as "considerations ... suggest" and "complex factual assessments").
5. See infra Part I.C.1 (identifying the factors).
6. See E. Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 541 (1998) ("Cases attempting to
decide when a regulation becomes a taking are among the most litigated and
perplexing in current law.").
7. See infra notes 11-13 and accompanying text; William P. Barr et al.,
The Gild That Is Killing the Lily: How Confusion over Regulatory Takings
Doctrine Is Undermining the Core Protections of the Takings Clause, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 429 (2005) (considering the issue in the context of utility
regulation); Donald W. Large, The Supreme Court and the Takings Clause: The
Search for a Better Rule, 18 ENVTL. L. 3, 24-25 (1987) (discussing the "defects"
of a balancing test).
8. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 138-53.
9. Id.
20121
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intervening Supreme Court opinions.'0
A constitutional rule that lacks precision, such as the
Penn Central approach, may exhibit several types of
disadvantages. In fact, a statement that outcomes are "ad
hoc" is a confession of relative lawlessness. This kind of
approach invites overreaching by government officials who
evaluate cases differently than those whom they regulate.1 It
is likely to produce a large proportion of inconsistent
results-a case in courtroom A may result in the finding of a
taking while a closely similar case in courtroom B does not.
12
Also, an imprecise approach will undoubtedly produce more
expensive litigation, as governments and citizens struggle not
only to prove the facts essential to the balancing factors, but
also to persuade courts about how they should weigh and
understand those factors. 3 On the other hand, a vague rule
or test that lacks precision, may nevertheless be the most
accurate way to approach a given problem-if the problem
itself is difficult to define. This is the case for regulatory
takings, or at least the Supreme Court seems to think so.
This Article offers suggestions for how courts should
define and weigh the Penn Central balancing factors. Part
One of the Article differentiates three different types of
takings: condemnations, per se takings, and regulatory
takings. The interaction among these different types of
takings affects any evaluation of the balancing approach
addressed in this Article. Part Two describes the Penn
Central case itself, with an emphasis upon identifying and
deciphering the balancing factors that the Court used in
making its decision. Part Three contains a discussion of the
difference between formal or rule-oriented approaches, on the
one hand, and instrumental or policy-based approaches on
the other. It also describes the policies that support the
10. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
11. Cf Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983) (explaining that
the principal problem of vague regulation is that it fails to guide and limit
enforcement by public officials).
12. Cf id. at 357 (explaining tendency of vague regulation to produce
'arbitrary" and "discriminatory" results).
13. Cf New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (discussing need for a
"bright-line" rule to reduce collateral consequences of vagueness), distinguished
in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 499-500 (2009) (recognizing the policy
underlying bright-line rules but limiting Belton to cases where its policy is
supported).
(Vol. 52
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Takings Clause, since the Penn Central factors are part of an
instrumental approach 14 that attempts to produce results that
advance these policies. Part Four contains the most
important feature of the Article: a framework for considering
the balancing factors. The final section provides conclusions,
which include the suggestion that the greatest weight should
be placed upon relatively few of the factors, and that at least
one factor should be accorded very little weight because it
should not have been included in the first place.
I. THREE TYPES OF TAKINGS CASES
A. The Simplest Cases: Straight Condemnation
The simplest kind of takings case occurs when the
government takes title to property. 15 These cases usually
involve straight condemnation, in which the government
exercises the power of eminent domain. There can be serious
issues in these cases regarding the compensation amount, 16
but usually, if the government takes title to property, it
recognizes that it has engaged in a taking and that just
compensation is due."7
Occasionally, there are cases concerning whether the
government has, in fact, taken title to property. For example,
consider the possibility that the government uses a patented
invention. It seems well established that the government
owes a royalty as just compensation,' 8 but even if this
conclusion did not follow from statutes and common law,
perhaps it should be the result by reason of the Takings
Clause. 9 There are other situations in which the government
14. See infra Part II.A (identifying instrumentalism).
15. See Yee, 503 U.S. at 522 (describing cases in which government "takes
title").
16. E.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (discussing the remedy for takings, i.e., "just
compensation"); United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24 (1984)
(discussing different methods of determining compensation).
17. Yee, 503 U.S. at 522 (explaining that these cases "generally require
compensation").
18. E.g., United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966) (determining that
Adams's battery was patented validly and assuming that the United States' use
of it required payment).
19. See infra Part I.B. The issue is unclear; however, it seems difficult to
conclude that the case is one of physical occupation. In addition, it is hard to
analyze the case so that it requires compensation under the Penn Central
20121
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obtains the benefit of intangible or other personal property
without clearly taking title, but it should owe just
compensation by analogy to the land condemnation cases.2 °
B. Cases Resulting in "Virtually Per Se" Takings: The
Loretto, Nollan, Dolan, and Lucas Decisions
1. Physical Occupation as a Per Se Taking
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corporation,21 the Court created a category of just
compensation cases that result in "virtually per se" takings.
The government in Loretto required landowners to allow cable
television providers to install equipment on their property
and gave so-called compensation of one dollar per instance.22
The Court characterized the case as one of "physical
occupation" of property, holding that such an occupation
results in a taking, virtually per se.23 This kind of case does
not require a balancing test.
Identifying a physical occupation, according to the Court,
depended upon the kind and amount of government
interference to the enjoyment of the bundle of rights that
flowed from ownership of the particular property. One of the
most important indicators was the loss of the right to exclude
others from the property.' Because the government denied
landowners the right to exclude cable operators from
installing equipment on the landowners' property, the
government's action amounted to a physical occupation of the
land, and it was a virtually per se taking. One of the
problems that the Court considered was how to distinguish
cases in which the government itself necessarily encroached
physically upon land while performing a regulatory
function.2" The Court solved that problem simply by
describing the regulatory-presence problem as outside the
scope of its ruling.26
factors. See infra Part I.C.
20. E.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (holding that
government acquisition and publication of trade secrets can be a taking).
21. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
22. Id. at 421-24.
23. Id. at 421.
24. Id. at 435.
25. Id. at 440.
26. Id.
[Vol. 52
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The Court developed its per se analysis more completely
in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.27 There, the
California Coastal Commission had required a landowner to
dedicate publicly a lateral easement along the landowner's
beach property, as a condition of permitting the landowner to
remodel an oceanfront home.2 The lateral easement would
have allowed members of the public to walk along the beach
over the landowner's property. 29 The Commission offered two
justifications for what it argued was regulation rather than a
taking: the obstruction of views that would result from the
new construction and the accompanying psychological barrier
preventing accessing the beach caused by the larger
construction.3 0 The Court, through Justice Scalia, held that
the easement requirement resulted in a loss of the right to
exclude barefooted wanderers across the Nollans' beach.31
The government therefore created a physical occupation of
the property, and consequently the government's action
amounted to a per se taking. Justice Brennan dissented,
believing that the easement created only temporary and
slight occupations, and arguing that the per se category was
not a proper means of analyzing takings cases in the first
place.2
2. The Nollan-Dolan Test: Physical Occupations That Are
Not Takings
The more interesting aspect of the case was the Court's
treatment of physical occupations that are necessary for
regulatory reasons and therefore are excused from becoming
per se takings. For example, a city may require a subdivision
developer to publicly dedicate adequate streets, even though
this regulation results in a physical occupation of land under
the streets. Justice Scalia wrote that the government could
salvage its regulation, even in a case of physical occupation, if
it could demonstrate a close nexus between its regulatory
goals and the regulatory means chosen.3 3 In other words, if
27. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
28. Id. at 827-28.
29. Id. at 828.
30. Id. at 828-29.
31. Id. at 831-32.
32. Id. at 842-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 835-36; see also id. at 865 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (using the
"close nexus" terminology).
2012]
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the exaction the government proposed to impose upon the
landowner was not closely related to its justification or
regulatory goal, the case would not result in a mere
regulation, but in a taking that required just compensation.
The close nexus requirement, said Justice Scalia, was not so
lax as to amount to the kind of rational basis test that applies
in property-related Due Process cases, nor was it a supremely
heavy burden like the requirements in strict scrutiny cases; it
was an intermediate standard. 4
Why did Justice Scalia specify a close nexus standard?
The answer, one can infer, is that this standard prevents
pretextual takings-although the Court did not explain its
standard precisely this way. Imagine that the government
wants to take land that belongs to a private owner-call him
John Jones-but the government does not want to pay for it.
The government therefore engages in the subterfuge of
"regulating" Jones's land in a manner that is unrelated to its
regulatory goal of creating a park. It tells Mr. Jones, for
example, that drainage is needed and that he cannot build on
the land or use it for any purpose other than recreation by the
general (nonpaying) public. The close nexus test would cut
through this pretext and identify the government's action as a
taking.
On the other hand, there are situations in which the
government requires the loss of the right to exclude for proper
regulatory reasons. Imagine, instead, that Mr. Jones is a
residential subdivision developer who has submitted a plat of
his land to the city for approval. The city requires him to
dedicate parts of the land as streets, for use by the public. In
this case, the regulatory goal is traffic and transportation, the
regulatory means is streets, and the two are closely related.
The city passes the close nexus test in this case, and its
requirement of adequate streets is regulation, not a taking,
even though Jones has lost the right to exclude the public
from the streets. The close nexus test separates proper
regulation from pretextual takings.
This test, when applied to the Nollan case, resulted in
the conclusion that the government could not salvage its
regulation, because there was no close nexus between the
regulatory goals and means. The regulatory goals were scenic
34. See id. at 837.
[Vol. 52
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views of the beach from afar and removal of a psychological
barrier against entry to the beach.35 According to Justice
Scalia, it was "quite impossible" to see how these goals were
advanced by the creation of a public right to walk laterally
along the beach." Since the landowner had lost the right to
exclude, the case fit into the category of virtually per se
takings, and because there was no close nexus between the
regulatory means and the regulatory goal, the Commission's
regulation was a pretextual taking-thus the Commission
could not extract the easement without paying just
compensation.
The Court soon added another requirement for a
government that claims its encroachment upon property is
mere regulation and not a taking. In Dolan v. City of Tigard,
the Court required a "rough proportionality" between the
burden created upon a landowner and the need addressed as
the regulatory goal.3 The government there had required a
landowner to refrain from building on part of the land to
allow for drainage and to create a bicycle path to alleviate
congestion. The Court remanded for a determination
whether the exaction from the landowner was in rough
proportion to the regulatory need.3 9 The rough proportionality
requirement prevents the government from taking more than
it needs for the claimed regulatory purpose.
Together, the Nollan and Dolan cases provide a two-part
test for regulatory justifications of governmentally required
physical occupations. First, the government must show a
close nexus between the regulatory goal and the regulatory
means. Second, the government must demonstrate that there
is a rough proportionality between the size of the exaction
from the landowner and the extent of the need for the
regulatory purpose. The first requirement prevents
pretextual takings, such as the hypothetical regulation of
John Jones's land that converts it, in reality, into a park. The
second prevents the government from using a valid
regulatory justification to impose a much greater burden on
the citizen than the justification supports. In other words, it
35. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
36. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838.
37. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
38. Id. at 380.
39. Id. at 396.
20121
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prevents the government from "taking a mile when an inch
would do."
3. Another Type of Per Se Taking: Destruction of All
Value
The Court added another category of virtually per se
takings in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council:
regulation that destroys all economic value.4° In Lucas, the
government regulated a parcel of privately owned land in a
way that prevented it from being used in any economical
manner.41 The Court held that the destruction of all economic
value in a piece of property created a taking per se, without
the need for balancing various factors.42 The Court has never
indicated whether a government can salvage a destruction-of-
all-value regulation by demonstrating compliance with the
Nollan-Dolan test, although perhaps it can, by analogy to the
physical occupation cases.
4. A Summary: Per Se Takings
In summary, the Court created two categories of virtually
per se takings: those in which the government has required a
physical occupation of the property, and those in which the
government regulates in such a way as to destroy all
economic value in the property. At least in the first type of
case, and possibly in the second, the Court has created a
method in which the government can avoid having its
regulation characterized as a taking, even if it would
otherwise fit within the virtually per se category.
Specifically, the government can succeed at salvaging its
regulation by demonstrating compliance with the Nollan-
Dolan test: that is, by showing, first, that its regulatory
means and goals are in close nexus, and second, that the
burdens it has imposed are roughly proportional to the
regulatory need. These statements reflect a short summary
of per se takings law.
40. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-19 (1992).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1015-16, 1027-29.
[Vol. 52
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C. Regulatory Takings: The Penn Central Balancing
Approach
Not all takings cases can be analyzed by per se rules. Per
se rules are narrowly defined and there are an infinite
number government actions that might result in takings.43 In
most takings cases that involve regulation, the prevailing
analysis does not apply these per se rules. Instead, the Court
applies the balancing test described in the Penn Central case.
The Penn Central case centered on actions by the New
York City Preservation Commission charged with protecting
historical landmarks." One of Penn Central's rail terminals
in New York was Grand Central Station.45 The Station's
longstanding function, appearance, and character made it an
obvious candidate for historical designation. 6 Treatment of a
structure as a historical landmark might seem an honor, but
if so, it was not without disadvantages, and this particular
designation was costly to Penn Central. It meant that the
building had to be preserved in its historical form, and
changes required the Commission's approval.47 Penn Central,
as a railroad, was almost by definition financially strapped.4"
It proposed to build a skyscraper on the site of Grand Central
Station.49 The land was valuable for this use and skyscrapers
surrounding Grand Central were far more economically
valuable than Grand Central Station itself. Since it had to
preserve Grand Central Station, Penn Central proposed
to have its lessee construct a skyscraper that
would be cantilevered over the terminal."0 The Preservation
Commission rejected this development plan, while leaving
open the possibility that another plan might be approved. 5'
Penn Central, believing with some justification that the
Commission would never permit any viable construction
43. Compare, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (involving
prohibition of sales of parts of birds), with Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488
U.S. 299 (1989) (involving electricity rate regulation).
44. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 110.
45. Id. at 115.
46. Id. at 115-16.
47. Id. at 112.
48. ICC v. Texas, 479 U.S. 450, 460 (1987) (recognizing "financial
difficulties" of major railroads).
49. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 116.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 117-18.
2012]
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plan,52 filed suit. It claimed that the Commission's actions,
even though undertaken in the guise of regulation, amounted
to a taking of its property. 5
1. The Penn Central Balancing Factors
Justice Brennan wrote the opinion for the Court. This in
itself indicated the likely outcome, because Justice Brennan
took a limited view of the Takings Clause, sometimes in ways
that had to be read to be believed.54 He began by announcing
that the identification of takings was "a problem of
considerable difficulty."5 He quoted a frequent statement:
the purpose of the Fifth Amendment was to bar government
from forcing "some people to bear public burdens alone,
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole."56 By defining the issue in this way,
Justice Brennan set the stage for a confined reading of the
Takings Clause, as discussed later in this Article.5
The reason for the difficulty of the problem, Justice
Brennan said, was that the Court had been unable to develop
any "set formula" for recognizing when the government
should compensate for an injurious action, versus when it
should allow the loss to be "concentrated on a few persons."58
The question remained an "essentially ad hoc, factual
inquir[y]. " 9 The Court had "identified several factors that
have particular significance" in pursuit of this inquiry.6 °
Then, Justice Brennan proceeded to identify (or rather,
suggest) what today we know as the Penn Central balancing
factors. Unfortunately, it is difficult to count the factors,
52. For example, no construction has ever occurred over the years, in spite
of the economic value a building might have.
53. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 120.
54. E.g., in Andrus, Justice Brennan wrote the Court's opinion in a case in
which federal law prevented any sales of certain taxidermist-preserved eagles,
including those purchased by investors before the law had passed. One might
readily conclude that this law would produce negative economic effects for the
investors, but Justice Brennan denied that any such effect was "clear," because
the investors "might exhibit the artifacts for an admissions charge." Andrus,
444 U.S. at 66. This supposition enabled him to reject a takings claim. Id.
55. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123.
56. Id. (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
57. Infra Part III.B (discussing this formulation and its tendency to limit
the protections of the Takings Clause).
58. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
59. Id.
60. Id.
[Vol. 52
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because the Court did not identify them in a way that allows
them to be easily separated, but there are at least six factors
and possibly more.
i. Interference with Distinct Investment-Backed
Expectations
The first factor was "[t]he economic impact of the
regulations on the claimant."6' This statement of the factor
was modified by the observation that it was "particularly" the
"extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations" that was "relevant."62 The
Court apparently regarded the importance of this factor as
obvious, because it preceded its identification of the factor
with the phrase, "[o]f course."63 The precise wording of the
factor matters, however, and the function it fulfills depends
upon the view one takes of several loaded terms, as discussed
in a later section of this Article.
ii. The Extent of Physical Invasion
The "character of the government action" was a second
factor.' The Court further elaborated on this general
statement: "A 'taking' may more readily be found when the
interference with the property can be characterized as a
physical invasion by government," rather than an
"adjust[ment of] the benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the common good." 5 This factor looks strange in
light of the holdings in Loretto and Nollan, which established
that physical occupation amounted to a virtually per se
taking rather than just a balancing factor.6 The conflict is
explainable by the observation that Penn Central was decided
first, before the creation of the doctrine of virtually per se
takings. Justice Brennan, who dissented in the per se cases,
wrote the opinion in Penn Central, and his reasoning reflects
his anti-per-se philosophy. Nevertheless, the conflict remains
between the treatment of physical occupation in Penn Central
as a balancing factor and its use in Loretto and Nollan as a
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See supra Part I.B.1.
2012]
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non-balancing per se indicator-and therefore the conflict
requires some sort of reconciliation if takings jurisprudence is
to maintain coherence. The required reconciliation also will
be discussed in a later section.61
iii. A Broad Public Purpose, Short of Destruction of
All Economic Value
To discern the next element in Penn Central, the broad-
public-purpose factor, the reader must parse the Court's
description of a number of decisions that coalesce to form the
factor. The Court's analysis of the decisions identifies broad
public purpose as a factor in a disembodied way, but
unmistakably. The Court first states that governments can
avoid the finding of a taking when it reasonably believes that
the "health, safety, morals or welfare" will benefit from
actions by which property interests will be "destroyed or
adversely affected."6 8 This general statement, of course,
would allow any regulatory taking to avoid being
compensated for, no matter how confiscatory. The Court
narrowed the factor somewhat, by characterizing favored
government action as promoting a "substantial public
purpose."69 The limit is reached when there is "an unduly
harsh impact" upon the property owner.70 The word "unduly,"
unfortunately, makes this statement so vague as to be of little
value, but the Court gave at least one example: takings that
result from the "complete destruction of [the property
owner's] rights."71 A later section will attempt to define this
vaguely outlined factor.72
iv. Regulation of Noxious Uses
The fourth factor is regulation of noxious uses of
property. This factor, again, emerges from statements that
identify it only indirectly, but nonetheless clearly. The Court
cited a case in which government action required the removal
of cedar trees without compensation because cedar rust
67. See infra Part III.B.
68. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 105.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 127.
71. Id.
72. See infra Part III.A.
[Vol. 52
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fatally affected other trees.7 3 It also cited a decision that
halted a longstanding business of sand and gravel mining
because the property owner's activities were conducted below
the water table and thus were interfering with the water
supply.74 In cases in which the government prevents a
noxious use-those in which the circumstances require a
"choice" between preservation of "one class of
property or [another] "7 5-a taking can be avoided even if the
government's action destroys value in the property.
v. Uniquely Public Functions
The Court said that takings often occur when they arise
from "acquisitions of resources to permit or facilitate uniquely
public functions.7 6 As an example, the Court cited a case in
which direct overflights of aircraft above the claimant's
land destroyed its present use for livestock farming. The
government had not "merely destroyed property [but was]
using a part of it for the flight of its planes."7 8 This factor,
too, requires interpretation, and a later section will supply
it. 79
vi. Comprehensiveness or Reciprocity of Advantage
This factor (or pair of factors) emerges not from the part
of the opinion in which the Court stated the law, but from its
application of the law to the facts. More accurately, it
appears in the Court's rejection of Penn Central's attempted
distinction of the New York Landmark Law from
constitutionally permissible zoning laws. Zoning and related
kinds of regulation are constitutional, said the Court, if they
exercise "land use control as part of some comprehensive
plan." 8  The requirement of comprehensiveness tends to
prevent "discriminatory" regulation.81 If one's neighbor is
subject to the same regulation that burdens one's own
73. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 125-26, citing Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272
(1928).
74. Id. at 126-27.
75. Id. at 126.
76. Id. at 128.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See infra Part IIJ.D.
80. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 132.
81. Id.
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property, not only is it unlikely that the law discriminates in
the sense of invidiously singling anyone out, but the very fact
of comprehensiveness means that democratic action will
probably prevent unduly severe or dysfunctional government
action.
As for reciprocity of advantage, it might be argued that
this factor is distinct from the comprehensiveness element, or
it might be argued that it is an aspect of comprehensiveness.
In any event, the concept of reciprocity of advantage can be
seen as an element in the Court's rejection of Penn Central's
distinction of zoning laws. The Court maintained that Penn
Central was not "unbenefited" by the New York law. 2 It
observed that hundreds of other structures in more than 30
historical districts were similarly designated as landmarks,
"many of which are close to the Terminal."83 The preservation
of landmarks in this manner "benefits all New York citizens
and all structures, both economically and by improving the
quality of life in the city as a whole."8 In other words, Penn
Central benefited economically from the Landmark Law
because, for example, an attractive city serves as a tourist
and business magnet that increases transportation and
expands its business. Arguably, it also results in a better
quality of life that benefits Penn Central less directly
because, for example, it makes employment with Penn
Central more desirable. This factor can be seen as a
consequence of the comprehensiveness of the regulation,
which leads to mutual benefit, or it can be seen as a separate
factor. This is an example of the difficulty of quantifying the
Penn Central factors, because one can readily argue that the
six factors identified here are actually seven. In any event,
the meanings of comprehensiveness and reciprocity of
advantage are dealt with later in the Article. 5
2. Other Possible Factors
There are other possible factors. The Court adds, near
the end of its reasoning, that it must consider whether the
interference with Penn Central's property is "of such a
82. Id. at 134.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See infra Part III.C.2.
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magnitude" that it should be characterized as a taking.8 6 But
there are substantial arguments against the inclusion of this
element among the balancing factors. The question whether
anything is "of such magnitude" as to be characterized as a
taking is too indefinite to be useful. It does not explain how
to measure the "magnitude" in question, or even determine
what the crucial magnitude is composed of. To answer that
question, one would need to consult more specific indications,
such as the same six factors that are described above. In fact,
the Court interpreted the "magnitude" inquiry as an
investigation into the first factor: interference with distinct
investment-backed expectations.8 7 Penn Central, it pointed
out, could still employ Grand Central Station in its present
use; it could still hope to make a profit from the Terminal
even if not a profit from its operations overall; it could
reapply to the Commission for permission to build a different
(smaller) cantilevered building; and it had been provided with
transferable rights usable in other locations as a kind of quid
pro quo. 88 The Court's observation that these factors
mitigated the "financial burden" on Penn Central indicates
that the inquiry into the magnitude of the interference was
not a distinct inquiry.
3. The Court's Application of the Penn Central Factors
Once Justice Brennan had set the framework of these
principles, the pathway to the outcome was downhill from
there. The Landmark Law did not frustrate investment-
backed expectations of Penn Central because, among other
reasons, the company could still earn a return from the
Terminal.89 There was no physical invasion of the land, and
the Court spent little effort to establish this conclusion.90 The
law was like those upheld for having a broad public purpose,
and it was unlike those in which regulations went too far by
destroying all of the landowner's rights. 9'
The noxious use factor had little to do with the Court's
analysis, because there was no obvious application of this
86. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 136.
87. Id. at 124.
88. Id. at 136-37.
89. Id. at 136.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 135.
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factor under the facts. Furthermore, the Commission's
actions, according to the Court, did not amount to an
acquisition of resources to facilitate uniquely public
functions. 2 Finally, the regulation, like proper zoning laws,
was comprehensive, and it provided a reciprocity of
advantage to Penn Central.93 The conclusion followed that
the City "ha[d] not effected a 'taking"' of Penn Central's
property.
94
4. The Dissent: Just How Mushy Are These Balancing
Factors?
The dissent is remarkable in its apparent acceptance of
the principles emphasized by the Court, or at least some of
them. The disagreement arises from the application of the
principles to the facts. In other words, the dissent gives
evidence of the "mushiness" of the law that governs
regulatory takings.
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Stevens, began by rejecting the conclusion that the
Landmark Law was comprehensive. 95 "Only in the most
superficial sense of the word can this case be said to involve
'zoning.'"96 While neighboring landowners were free to use
their land in any manner consistent with other laws, Penn
Central was bound by this law to "forever maintain its
property in its present state."9 v Further, according to the
dissent, there was no reciprocity of advantage. The law
imposed losses upon "less than one-tenth of one percent of the
buildings in New York City for the general benefit of all its
people."9" The economic impact of the government's action
was significant: the City had "thus destroyed-in a literal
sense, 'taken'--substantial property rights of Penn Central."99
The regulation was not aimed at abating a nuisance or
noxious use. "It is exactly this imposition of general costs on
a few individuals at which the 'taking' protection is
92. See id. at 128.
93. Id. at 132.
94. Id. at 138.
95. Id. at 139 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 143.
98. Id. at 147.
99. Id. at 143.
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directed. " "°
II. THE ULTIMATE QUESTION: WHAT IS THE
TAKINGS CLAUSE SUPPOSED TO ACCOMPLISH?
This disagreement between the majority and the dissent
indicates a need to return to first principles, precisely because
the difference between the two opinions is itself largely
unprincipled. First principles are particularly important here
because the jurisprudence of the Penn Central approach is an
example of "instrumentalism": an approach that attempts to
fulfill underlying policies rather than follow formal rules.
This section will examine the ramifications of this conclusion
and of the resulting need to examine first principles.
Furthermore, this section will explore the possible underlying
principles of the Penn Central balancing approach. The
balancing factors should be compared to those principles,
because the value of the balancing approach depends upon
how well it achieves the underlying policies.
A. Formalism and Instrumentalism
The regulatory takings jurisprudence is an interesting
application of the difference between formalism and
instrumentalism. Formalism, sometimes referred to as
literalism, is a jurisprudence of precise rules that can be
applied directly to situational facts. 101 Instrumentalism,
which can also be called functionalism, instead attempts to
discern the purposes or policies underlying a law and applies
the law to achieve those purposes. °2 In construing a murder
statute, for example, the formalist would consider the words
of the law and compare each element to the case facts. For
example, the formalist would consider whether the evidence
shows that the defendant (1) caused (2) the death of (3) an
individual (4) by acting purposefully (intentionally) or
knowingly. The instrumentalist, on the other hand, would
attempt to discern the purpose of the law and construe it to
carry out that purpose. For example, the instrumentalist
would evaluate whether the evidence shows an unjustified
100. Id. at 147.
101. See DAVID CRUMP, How TO REASON ABOUT THE LAW: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO THE FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 322-23
(2001).
102. See id.
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taking of human life in a way that is characterized by
blameworthiness.
Both types of jurisprudence have advantages and
disadvantages. Formalism promotes predictability,
uniformity, consistent application, and confinement of
government action by rules. But an excess of formalism leads
to wooden application of law in ways that contradict its
purposes. 10 3 Instrumentalism, on the other hand, promotes
interpretation of law to carry out its intended results, but it
creates a great risk of inconsistency, arbitrariness, and
unconfined government action. 104 Sometimes it is difficult to
create formal rules to deal with complex issues. Sometimes,
on the other hand, formal rules are needed to rationalize laws
that are necessarily written in general terms. There is
constant tension between these two approaches.
In the takings jurisprudence, the rules about virtually
per se categories, including the Nollan-Dolan test, are
examples of relative formalism. They create rules that
usually can be applied directly to case facts. They give more
or less predictable outcomes. The Penn Central balancing
test, on the other hand, is more instrumental. Its factors are
designed to carry out the purposes of the Takings Clause
discerned by the Court. Both of these conclusions are
relative; most approaches to legal questions partake
somewhat of both formalism and instrumentalism. It is easy,
for example, to hypothesize cases in which application of the
formal rules for per se takings require application to new
facts that can best be considered in an instrumentalist way. 10 5
Similarly, it is equally possible to conjure up examples in
which the application of the Penn Central factors is so clear
that it reduces to one or more rules that can be applied
formally. 10 6
The Penn Central balancing factors represent the general
approach to the Takings Clause, applicable to cases that do
not fit a mold so neat as to be amenable to specific rules.
103. See id at 322-23.
104. See id.
105. For example, one might consider a case in which it is unclear whether a
physical occupation has taken place and in which figuring out what is meant by
.physical occupation" depends upon the policy underlying this concept.
106. For example, one might consider a case in which the economic impact is
severe and the law is not comprehensive, in which case the balance may be so
tilted that the outcome is as clear as the result of a formal rule.
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When specific rules are possible, they are desirable, provided
that one considers the need not to apply them too rigidly.'
The categories of virtually per se takings are examples. They
provide exceptions to the general approach of Penn Central,
with its undefined balancing of vaguely described factors. In
the general case, a balancing test may be the best we can
hope for, as the dissent's apparent acceptance of some of the
balancing factors arguably indicates.
The first step in the use of an instrumental approach is to
define the purpose of the law. This step is crucial, and it was
not carried out with much attention in Penn Central.
Therefore, this Article turns next to the identification of the
policies underlying the Takings Clause.
B. The Policies Underlying the Takings Clause:
Deontological and Consequentialist Approaches
Unfortunately, we do not have a unified field theory of
the policies underlying the Takings Clause. There are some
indications in the original understanding, but they are not so
specific as to control the resolution of specific cases. 108
Statements about the policies differ significantly. There are
some statements of policy that are anchored in the kind of
moral, right-and-wrong philosophy that is characteristic of
deontological philosophy: °9 the justice-based philosophy of
Immanuel Kant. This approach emphasizes the following of
fair rules for individuals, simply put. There are other
statements that are characterized more by the
consequentialist, utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham
and John Stuart Mill: an approach that emphasizes
economics as a guide. This approach attempts to make rules
work out to enlarge the pie for the society in general (again,
107. This is because of the vagueness of balancing rules, which create several
disadvantages. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
108. Thus, opponents of the regulatory takings doctrine argue that the
original meaning of the Takings Clause cannot be reconciled with the modem
approach, while proponents argue the opposite. See James S. Burling, A Short
History of Regulatory Takings-Where We Have Been and What Are the Hot
Issues of Today, ALI-ABA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., CONDEMNATION 101: HOW
TO PREPARE AND PRESENT AN EMINENT DOMAIN CASE (unpaginated; followed by
n. 26) (Jan. 8-10, 2009) (presenting differing views), but see Douglas W. Kmiec,
The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause Is Neither Weak nor Obtuse,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630 (1988).
109. Cf Burling, supra note 108 at nn.7-9 and accompanying text.
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perhaps simplistically put).11 ° This is the great divide in
moral philosophy-that between consequentialism (here,
economics) and deontology (here, justice)-and it bears upon
the inquiry into the purposes of the Takings Clause.
1. A Deontological or Civil-Liberties Policy: Preventing
Sacrifice of the Individual
The policy statement contained in Justice Brennan's
Penn Central opinion emphasizes the inappropriateness of
"forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.""1 This approach is heavily deontological. Its criteria
are "fairness and justice." Unfortunately, the meaning of this
statement is enormously malleable, because it depends upon
one's concept of fairness and justice. The statement
has appeared in many Supreme Court opinions," and one
probably can infer that it is a part of what the Fifth
Amendment means, when judged either by the original
understanding or by contemporary standards.1
3
2. An Economic Policy: Limiting Thoughtless
Regulation, Harmonizing Competing Needs, and
Encouraging Investment
On the other hand, the Takings Clause serves distinct
economic purposes."' This approach to the clause is
consequentialist, and it is utilitarian. The economic view of
the Takings Clause is more difficult to describe than the
deontological view, as is often the case, since deontology
110. See CRUMP, supra note 101, at 220-21 (showing that this philosophy
supports an economic view); cf id. at 211-13 (describing Kant's deontology and
showing its greater tendency to prevent confiscation of property than certain
kinds of consequentialism, such as pure utilitarianism as described by
Bentham).
111. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
112. E.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) and
authorities therein cited.
113. Cf Eric T. Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 75,
85, 88 n.31 (2010) (demonstrating the prevalence of moral arguments in the pre-
constitutional colonies). For contemporary standards, see supra notes 108-09
and accompanying text.
114. See DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 354 (5th ed. 2009) (citing Donald G. Hagman, The Compensation Issue:
Theories of Liability for Damages from Planning and Land Use Controls, ABA-
ALI CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., Mar. 26, 1980).
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depends on an intuitive sense of justice. The economic
purposes of the Takings Clause can be described in at least
three different ways:
Limiting Thoughtless and Excessive Government
Intervention That Might Result from a Failure to Confront
the Costs. If we focus upon the regulator, rather than the
potentially small part of society "sacrificed" to the general
good, we discover that the compensation requirement has
a beneficial effect by requiring the regulator to consider
the costs of the regulation.'15 This notion has been put
in terms of restraining the "exuberance" of regulators." 6
If there is no need to pay for the property taken, the
regulator is likely to focus only on the issues that the
regulator is interested in-without the restraint of
weighing the real costs imposed upon other individuals,
and possibly on the society as a whole." 7
Harmonizing Competing Social Needs. A regulatory
taking may remove productive property from its best use.
Jobs, commerce and products may be lost because firms
and individuals will fear that their interests are
unprotected. 118 This purpose really is a generalized
version of the previous concern with restraining the
exuberance of regulators. 19 Individuals and, possibly,
society as a whole bear the costs imposed. 2 ° For example,
if a regulator wishes to condemn land upon which a
factory is operating and convert it to park space, the
takings jurisprudence requires that regulator to
harmonize the need for park space against the cost in jobs,
products, and commerce that would be imposed by
shutting down the factory.
Inducing Investment Through Protecting Settled
Expectations. The compensation requirement furthers the
policy that "certain settled expectations of a focused and
crystallized sort should be secure against the
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
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government's disruption, at least without appropriate
compensation."121 Thus, the Supreme Court has
emphasized the importance of investment-backed
expectations in the takings jurisprudence. 22 There are "a
number of expectancies embodied in the concept of
'property'-expectancies that, if sufficiently important, the
government must condemn and pay for [the property)
before it takes over the management of the landowner's
property."
123
3. Comparing the Two Approaches
Which approach-the deontological concern with
preventing unfair sacrifice of the individual, or the
consequentialist focus upon economics-provides greater
protection to the landowner? At first blush, one might be
tempted to say that the civil liberties approach provides
greater protection. But there is a paradox here. Actually, the
economic approach may provide greater security to owners of
property in many cases, although the answer probably
depends upon the situation. This conclusion must seem
counterintuitive to lawyers schooled in the jurisprudence of
Due Process.1 2
4
The paradox is resolvable by consideration of an example.
Imagine an investor whose farsightedness has been rewarded
by significant returns. As a result, the investor is far
wealthier than his fellow citizens. The government has an
incentive to regulate in a manner that limits the returns that
would naturally flow from the investor's skill, foresight, and
industry, so the advantages can be redirected to the broad
majority of people. Let us imagine that the government,
having this motivation, figures out an effective way to cut the
investor's returns by half (or by nine-tenths). Some people,
following a "fairness" approach, may not feel offended by this
kind of regulation. It seems "fair" to many people for wealth
121. Id. (citing LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-4 (2d
ed. 1988)).
122. See id.
123. Id. at 355 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179
(1979)).
124. Or, perhaps not. The well-recognized law is that regulation of property
does not violate the Due Process Clause unless it lacks any "rational basis": an
approach that broadly permits intrusive regulation. See id. at 473.
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to be redistributed. 25
This explains the Court's statement in Penn Central, that
the purpose of the Takings Clause is to prevent sacrifice of
property-owning individuals when "fairness and justice"
suggest that the burden should be borne publicly. Otherwise,
an opening is provided to the regulator who would like to take
away the gains of the successful investor. All that is
necessary to decrease gains is to declare that the sacrifice is
fair and just. The utilitarian analysis of the Takings Clause's
purposes, on the other hand, may provide greater protection
to the investor. In other words, an economic view may put
the investor in a better position. A finding of a taking, when
government's aim is to effect a redistribution, would restrain
the exuberance of regulators, harmonize competing social
needs, and induce investment through protecting settled
expectations. 26 It may seem a paradox, but in the case of
property rights, an economic approach arguably protects the
individual more completely than a civil liberties approach.
Both of these purposes-avoiding sacrifice of the property
owner and serving the economy-seem likely to have been
motivators for the adoption of the Takings Clause. On the
one hand, the Clause is a part of the Bill of Rights, which was
considered a protection of individual liberties. On the other
hand, the Founders were heavily concerned with economics
and the protection of investment when they adopted the
Constitution.127 It is inconceivable that, in adopting either
the original Constitution or the Bill of Rights, they did not
have this purpose in mind.
125. Cf Energy Reserves Grp. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400,
416-17 (1983) (applying this reasoning to a law decreasing a seller's contracted-
for gains on the ground that the alleged contract impairment "rests on
significant and legitimate state interests").
126. See supra notes 114-23 and accompanying text.
127. See CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 180 (1956) (arguing that the principal
causes of the Constitutional Convention were economic); ROBERT L.
HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS: THE LIvES, TIMES, AND IDEAS OF
THE GREAT ECONOMIC THINKERS 37 (1967) (explaining that Adam Smith's
WEALTH OF NATIONS became "an economic blueprint" for the new American
state).
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III. How SHOULD THE COURTS TREAT THE
BALANCING FACTORS?: AN ANALYSIS
The balancing factors are designed to carry out the
purposes and policies underlying the Takings Clause: the
policies discussed in Part II.B above. The factors are, in other
words, essentially instrumental guidelines. But as the Penn
Central opinion identifies them (or in some instances, as it
suggests or hints at them), they serve that goal only loosely.
Some factors are very important but require further
definition. Other factors are appropriate considerations in
some cases, but they are less important in most cases, and
these factors also require further development. And there is
at least one factor that should not be included in the list at
all.
A. A Factor That Should Not Have Been Included (and That
Should Be Given Little Weight): Broad Public Purpose
The Penn Central opinion never specifically identifies
"broad public purpose" as a balancing factor. The opinion,
however, makes unmistakably clear the Court's inclusion
of some sort of balancing factor along these lines. 2 ' The
analysis that produces this factor consists of an explication of
cases that hold against takings in situations when broad
public purposes are present. The relevance of this factor is
limited, according to the Court, by the vague concern that
regulation might go "too far." "Going too far," of course, is not
a condition that can be reliably or uniformly recognized, and
the only real limit provided by the Court comes from its
condemnation (sometimes) of regulation that destroys all
value in the property. The implication left is that destruction
of value, short of complete destruction, is permissible without
compensation, if the regulation serves a broad public purpose.
But further consideration shows that this cannot be what the
factor means.
A broad public purpose is a desirable thing in a
democracy. Advantage provided by a regulation to a large
number of people is one indication that the regulation is
doing its job. But it is a very limited indicator by itself, and it
is a misleading indicator if the objective is to distinguish
regulations that go too far and become takings. An example
128. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
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will show why.
Imagine that the people of Capital City have inadequate
park space. There is a broad consensus about the need for
more parks, and there is recognition that many people's lives
would be improved if Capital City gains more parks. The City
has a limited budget, and is in dire financial straits, just as
many cities often are-just as New York City was at the time
of the Penn Central case. When it comes to paying just
compensation for private property that will later be converted
to park space, the public fisc in Capital City will not allow for
much. Therefore, people's representatives search for a way to
obtain park space without paying for it. They do not have to
look very far before they realize that a gentleman named
William Wealthy owns real estate in different areas
throughout the town. Some of it is employed in productive
uses, such as factories or office spaces. In any event, Mr.
Wealthy has plenty of money (he is a billionaire even aside
from his real estate holdings), and it seems "fair" to ask him
to pony up a greater share of resources toward the general
welfare. The members of the Capital City Council therefore
vote to "regulate" Mr. Wealth's land so that a portion of each
parcel will be used as park space.
The City will serve a broad public purpose by this
regulation, by providing the entire community with a free
park, even if Mr. Wealthy thinks that it is pure confiscation.
The City's action will avoid complete destruction of the value
of Mr. Wealthy's property because it chose to convert only
part of each parcel to park space. Perhaps Mr. Wealthy can
argue that the regulation in this case "goes too far," but there
is nothing in the broad-public-purpose balancing factor that
distinguishes how far a regulation may go to be excessive
from permissible regulation. In fact, the broad-public-
purpose factor justifies the failure to pay compensation: a
result obviously contrary to the Takings Clause.
The skeptic can argue that this example is outlandish.
Of course, this hypothetical situation is antithetical to any
sensible person's understanding of what would pass the Fifth
Amendment without compensation, but the point is that the
broad-public-purpose factor is of no help in recognizing this
fact. The skeptic might further argue that there are multiple
factors, and broad public purpose is only one of them. But it
is hard to imagine a situation in which a taking could be
20121
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converted to a non-taking simply because many people are in
favor of it. The broad-public-purpose factor is as likely to be a
false indicator as a true one, and even if it only serves as a
tie-breaker in close cases, it often will furnish a signpost in
the wrong direction.
In fact, the broad-public-purpose factor may point in the
wrong direction in most situations. By definition, it is
triggered by the existence of a large constituency. This
situation will elicit reaction from the political branches most
readily when the unavoidable disadvantages are forced on a
very few people. Democracy requires a large degree of
deference to the majority, which will prevail whenever there
is a broad public purpose. However, the point of the Bill of
Rights, and the purpose of a Madisonian democracy, is to
limit the accommodation of majority rule to protect the
minority.129
The broad-public-purpose factor does the opposite. This
conclusion emerges with even greater clarity if the policies
underlying the Takings Clause are consulted. A broad public
purpose is not an indication that the regulation avoids
concentrating public burdens on relatively few persons, and
thus it fails to conform to a deontologically defined civil-
liberties policy. Similarly, recognition of a broad public
purpose as a justification for imposing burdens and losses
cannot serve the consequentialist or economic purposes of
confining regulatory exuberance, harmonizing competing
uses, or protecting investors.
How, then, should a court treat the broad-public-purpose
factor? Courts should follow the rule of law. Adhering to the
rule of law includes following their best understanding of
opinions by the Supreme Court. Courts cannot simply ignore
a balancing factor that a Supreme Court opinion requires.
Yet the broad-public-purpose factor leads to results that one
would not expect to emerge from the Constitution. One
possible solution is to recognize that the broad public purpose
factor is not explicit in the opinion, and perhaps it does not
really exist. 130 This conclusion is defensible, but it is opposed
by the unmistakable clarity with which the factor emerges
from Justice Brennan's opinion.
129. See CRUMP ET AL., supra note 114, at 38-40.
130. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
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A second means of dealing with broad public purpose is to
give it very little weight. This approach conforms to the logic
of the Fifth Amendment, while preserving at least some
amount of obeisance to the rule of law that is expressed in
what is, after all, a Supreme Court opinion.
A third way to deal with the dilemma is to determine
that the factor is inapplicable to some kinds of situations,
such as cases in which the economic impact of the regulation
is large and is concentrated by a non-comprehensive regime
on one or a few persons. This approach is invited, perhaps, by
the limit expressed by the Court to the effect that broad
public purpose ceases to justify a regulation that goes too far.
This approach produces the result that significant economic
impact, lack of comprehensiveness, and concentration on few
people creates a regulation goes too far and the broad public
purpose, then, ceases to be a justification.
B. A Factor That Seems Obsolete in Light of Later Decisions:
Physical Invasion of the Property
In Penn Central, Justice Brennan wrote that physical
invasion was a factor that could show a taking.1 3 ' This
pronouncement has to be read with an understanding that it
was uttered before the Supreme Court developed its
jurisprudence of per se takings in its present form. After
Loretto and Nollan, physical invasion is more than a factor in
the balance; it indicates a per se taking unless the
government can demonstrate compliance with the Nollan-
Dolan test.132 Therefore, this balancing factor seems obsolete,
even though it is expressly emphasized in Penn Central. This
reasoning is tantamount to saying that Loretto and Nolan
overruled the part of Penn Central that treated physical
invasion as a mere balancing factor rather than a
determinative one.
There may, however, be some limited utility to the factor.
Cases may exist in which government has interfered
physically with the use of property in a manner than a
physical occupation or invasion. Sometimes determining
whether there is a physical occupation or invasion becomes a
matter of definition. For example, if government sends sound
131. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
132. See supra Part I.B.1.
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and vibration into a private person's property in a method to
cause harm, the Supreme Court has decided that a taking can
occur. 133 Whether sound and vibration is a physical invasion
is arguable. On the one hand, sound waves are physical. On
the other hand, the physical occupation decisions seem to
contemplate the entry of a solid body onto the property, with
the loss of the right to exclude the invaders. In any event,
this factor seems to have little usefulness in most cases in
light of the per se decisions, but arguably the factor could still
be relevant.
C. The Most Important Factors: Economic Impact,
Comprehensiveness, and Reciprocity of Advantage
1. The Economic Impact of the Regulation on the
Claimant
The Penn Central opinion begins the list of factors by
expressing that the "economic impact of the regulations on
the claimant" is "of course, relevant" to the determination of a
taking.1 34 The opinion qualifies this factor by adding the
"extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations" is "particularly"
important. 35 The Court's placement of this factor at the
beginning of the list, and its use of the words "of course," are
consistent with recognition that economic impact upon the
property owner is a significant issue. This factor is related to
both deontological and consequentialist policies underlying
the Takings Clause. The deontological view would emphasize
the concept that severe economic impact is indicative of
regulation that singles out an individual property owner for
sacrifice to the common good. The consequentialist view
would emphasize economic policies. In this view, concern for
adverse economic impact upon property owners would
constrain the exuberance of regulators, require consideration
of and harmonization of competing uses of property, and
protect investment. 36
133. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946).
134. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
135. See id.
136. See supra Part II.B.2.
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What does the economic impact factor mean and how
should it weigh in the balance? It is immediately apparent
that severe economic impact cannot, by itself, identify a
taking. Government often regulates in ways that
significantly reduce the value of property. Zoning, for
example, can cut land values into fractions, and yet the
Court's decisions upholding this kind of regulation does not
seem controversial. 137 The government can eliminate means
of livelihood in which people have invested significantly,
without offending the Constitution. On the other hand, even
a small exaction from a property owner can violate the
Takings Clause if other factors mark it as a taking.'38 The
conclusion follows that while the economic impact factor is
important, identifying a taking depends upon other factors
even if severe economic impact is present. Furthermore,
determining a taking requires a more precise understanding
of the kind of economic impact that matters.
The Penn Central opinion qualifies its pronouncement
about economic impact by adding that what is important is
"particularly" the "extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.'
' 39
This observation may be useful in defining the type of
economic impact that is most characteristic of a taking. The
"expectations" of a person in the position of a property
owner are significant, according to the Court. ' And it
is "investment-backed" expectations that matter most.'
Arguably, the sacrifice of the individual to the common good
is most apparent when the government has acted in such a
way to encourage people to invest and then has pulled the rug
out from under them and contradicted their expectations.
Furthermore, if this kind of government conduct could be
engaged in without compensation, the Takings Clause would
not fulfill its purpose of inducing investment. Nor would it
restrain the exuberance of regulators or motivate them to
harmonize competing uses of property.
137. Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 379 (1926)
(upholding a zoning ordinance with this effect even though Justice Sutherland,
who opposed a great deal of regulation of commerce, delivered the opinion).
138. See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998); Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
139. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
140. Id.
141. See id.
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Yet, a requirement that the economic impact be focused
upon "distinct investment-backed expectations" could prove
misleading. It suggests that it is the precise cost paid
recently by the current owner that determines this balancing
factor, but this interpretation would have counterproductive
consequences. For example, imagine that a regulator points
out that the owner bought the property long ago under
different conditions and paid a lesser price than would prevail
today.142 The regulator concludes, therefore, that the
property owner should not receive compensation measured by
current market value.
Likewise, imagine that regulations severely reduce
property value in a situation where the owner did not have
any means of predicting how much return the property might
produce at the time of acquisition, or even whether
any return, rather than a loss, could be expected at all.143
Imagine that a regulator in this case pounces on the Supreme
Court's use of the words "distinct . . . expectations" and
argues that no taking should result because the investor
lacked mathematical certainty that an investment would
have turned out to be a solid return, except that it now has
been reduced or destroyed by regulations. Finally, consider a
case in which the property owner has inherited the property
and therefore did not invest at all, and indeed, may not have
had expectations of receiving a return from the property until
it was inherited. In this case, imagine that the regulator
argues that the economic impact is irrelevant because of the
absence of both investment and expectations.
These regulatory arguments against the finding of a
taking are fallacious and they rest on a too-literal
interpretation of the "distinct investment-backed
expectations" language. The property owner who bought the
asset years ago in a less expensive market has held the
property at a cost in the meantime. The investor who could
not predict the exact future of the stock he purchased may
nevertheless have used foresight in buying the asset. And the
142. E.g., Energy Reserves Grp. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400
(1983) (upholding law that decreased income under a contract, in part because
of lengthy term of contract).
143. E.g., id. (upholding regulations, partly because investor's expectations
were uncertain).
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person who unexpectedly inherited property without knowing
its value was preceded by an owner who created that value.
Each of these investors would be singled out for sacrifice to
the common good if these excuses for not finding a taking
were to succeed so that the deontological policy underlying
the Takings Clause would be frustrated. From an economic
standpoint, regulators could act with unrestrained
exuberance by finding targets such as these; they would not
need to harmonize their desired projects with other property
uses and investors would not feel secure. The
consequentialist purposes of the Clause would be frustrated
by these economic results.
Yet, the Penn Central language encourages precisely this
kind of fallacy. After its observations about the economic
impact factor and its explanation that distinct investment
backed expectations are what makes it significant, the Court
went on to emphasize that the property owner (Penn Central)
could still "profit" from Grand Central Station.' It could still
"obtain a 'reasonable return." 145 In other words, Penn
Central had acquired the property at issue long ago and could
not have expected with certainty that the value of its property
would actually increase significantly, as it did years later.
Apparently, the Court reasoned that trimming Penn Central's
return down to size was not a frustration of economic
expectations under these circumstances.
There are several responses to this logic. First, Penn
Central's economic decisions about Grand Central did not end
with its acquisition of the asset; it made the decision, year
after year, to retain it, rather than selling it for a major profit
and using those funds elsewhere. For example, imagine that
Penn Central had sold the property to someone else the year
before New York City adopted its Landmarks Law. The
unfortunate buyer would now be unable to make a profit,
much less a reasonable return, assuming the buyer paid
market value. But it seems odd to make the takings issue
depend upon who now owns the property or how recently that
person paid value.
Second, trimming a private firm's returns on its
profitable business, while leaving it with its inevitable losses
144. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 136.
145. Id.
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on other businesses, is certain to frustrate economic
expectations (not to mention, an undeniable way to produce
bankruptcies). A favorite example of this principle is that
Ford Motor Company was able to offset huge losses it suffered
by producing a model called the Edsel (a failure that enticed
very few buyers) because it obtained significant positive
returns from the Mustang (which was phenomenally
successful). If there had been a price regulation that limited
Ford to bare minimum (or even assertedly "reasonable")
returns on the Mustang, it would have disappointed
Ford's proper economic expectations. 146 Along the same line,
economists have made the case that so-called used-and-useful
regulation of utility rates-which limit investment from
which public service companies can earn returns-requires
the allowance of higher return rates on investments that
produce returns, to avoid characterization as a taking.'47 In
Penn Central's case, most of the company's investment
was unprofitable at the time, 148 and limiting its profitable
investment while leaving it with its losses was a heads-we-
win-tails-you-lose strategy for New York City. More to the
point, it frustrated Penn Central's perfectly proper
expectations even if it did allow a return, because then, the
return became so reduced that it could not offset much of
Penn Central's losses elsewhere.
So, how should the economic impact factor be
understood? It is not inappropriate to say, as the Court did,
that investment-backed expectations are significant in
evaluating the impact of a regulation. But once they have
identified the existence of these expectations, courts should
evaluate the economic impact factor by reference to the
market value of a successful investment, not by reference to
some after-the-fact projection of what is a "reasonable" return
from long-ago historical costs.
The weight of the economic impact factor should be
evaluated according to a two-step process: (1) by determining
first that the regulation frustrates investment-backed
expectations generated at some time in the past, and (2) by
measuring the severity of the resulting economic impact by
146. See CRUMP ET AL., supra note 114, at 374.
147. See id.
148. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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reference to current market value. This two-step approach
allows the economic impact factor to serve its purposes by
preventing the sacrifice of the few to the many, restraining
the exuberance of regulators, harmonizing competing uses of
property, and encouraging investment.
Still, the weight of the economic impact factor will
remain indeterminate, because this factor cannot determine a
taking alone. Economic impact is an important factor and
requires functional treatment that carries out its purpose, but
it is possible for a regulation to have severe impact without
becoming a taking. 4 9 The Penn Central balancing test
remains just that: a balancing test, in which the outcome is
the result of instrumentalism rather than formal rules.
Other factors must be consulted, even if the economic impact
is significant and adverse.
2. The Comprehensiveness Factor and Reciprocity of
Advantage
The Penn Central opinion relies heavily on an analogy
between the New York Landmark Law and zoning
ordinances.' 50 Zoning normally does not result in a taking.15 '
Usually zoning features a kind of comprehensiveness 152 that
avoids offending the policies underlying the Takings Clause.
Even if the values of some properties are reduced, zoning
arguably is consistent with the deontological policy
underlying the Takings Clause, because the extent of the
sacrifice of the few for the many may be lessened by the fact
that a zoning ordinance applies to a complete community, not
to a few selected properties. Similarly, the requirement of
breadth of application in a zoning law serves consequentialist
economic policies because it tends to restrain the exuberance
of the zoning authority, by requiring it to harmonize
competing uses and lessen its discouragement of investment.
In other words, the comprehensiveness factor helps the
balancing test serve its instrumentalist purposes, and the
149. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
150. Id. at 113-14.
151. E.g., Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 365.
152. A "comprehensive plan" is required in model zoning legislation, and this
model requirement has been widely adopted. See DAVID CRUMP ET AL.,
PROPERTY: CASES, DOCUMENTS AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES 530-33 (2d ed.
2008).
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courts ought to treat this factor as an important one.
By the same token, the breadth of the application of a
zoning ordinance produces a reciprocity of advantage in
which even those whose property is downzoned can hope to
benefit from the existence of the zoning scheme. For
example, although a given homeowner may feel limited by
being unable to open a gasoline filling station in the middle of
a residential block, the homeowner's disappointment at this
restriction is tempered by the benefits of a system in which no
other property owner on the block can open a gasoline filling
station. 153  The resulting regulation serves all homeowners
better than a regime in which owners would compete to
convert their properties to industrial uses that would devalue
the whole residential community. An economist might
describe zoning laws as mitigating negative externalities or
preventing a tragedy of the commons.5 It is a matter of
debate whether reciprocity of advantage is a corollary of the
comprehensiveness factor, a subsidiary consideration within
it, or a separate factor to be weighed independently in the
balance. In any event, the two concepts are related and
should be considered together.
The Penn Central case shows, however, that
comprehensiveness and reciprocity of advantage are
ambiguous factors, like the economic impact factor. New
York City's Landmark Law was not a zoning ordinance. It
applied to only a tiny fraction of properties in the city.
155
Furthermore, although the decisions of the Preservation
Commission were constrained by law, the criteria that they
applied were more malleable than zoning rules. Under these
circumstances, the majority and dissent came to different
conclusions even though they applied the same principles.
Justice Brennan's conclusion on these facts was that the New
York law was not like "discriminatory, or 'reverse spot,'
zoning.'15 6 Instead, the New York law "embodie[d] a
comprehensive plan" that had resulted in the designation of
153. E.g., Sanborn v. McLean, 206 N.W. 496 (Mich. 1925) (featuring exactly
such a problem, although the solution was furnished not by zoning laws but by
the somewhat analogous mechanism of equitable servitudes).
154. See CRUMP, supra note 100, at 118, 122-23 (explaining these concepts).
155. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 111.
156. Id. at 132.
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"over 400 landmarks." '157 The dissenters, on the other hand,
concluded from the same facts that the law was unlike
zoning, except in "the most superficial sense."158 Instead of
enacting a comprehensive plan, New York had "singled out
400" buildings in a city of over a million structures and
subjected them to "nonconsensual servitude[s] that [were] not
borne by any neighboring or similar properties." '59 In
summary, Penn Central demonstrates that the
comprehensiveness and reciprocity factors, which the Penn
Central opinion itself generated, do not convey a sufficiently
specific meaning to be very useful. These factors should be
considered against the policies that they are supposed to
carry out, so that their interpretation can be consistent with
those policies.
How can these concepts be understood to ensure that
they accomplish the policies underlying the Supreme Court's
instrumentalist test? In the first place, the greater the
flexibility of the criteria governing the application of the
claimed comprehensive plan-the greater the "play in the
joints," so to speak-the greater the likelihood that
government can impose burdens in a manner that defeats the
comprehensiveness of the regulation at issue. This conclusion
leads to the inference that in such a situation, government
officials can act upon personal taste, social theories, or
partisan political motivations in deciding upon whom to
impose the burdens of the regulatory plan. Thus, they can
single out some individuals for sacrifice to the general good.
Furthermore, their regulatory exuberance will not be as
easily contained, their motive to harmonize competing social
objectives will not be as great, and investors who look at the
process will not be encouraged by an atmosphere of arbitrary
choices. Conversely, a politically well-connected property
owner will have a greater ability to avoid being burdened,
because this owner can use the "play in the joints" together
with political favoritism to avoid being regulated as fellow
citizens are. This factor also reduces the comprehensiveness
of a regulatory plan.
157. Id. at 111, 132.
158. Id. at 139 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 138, 143.
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Second, the percentage of the relevant population that is
affected adversely by a given regulation should affect a
decision whether the regulation is comprehensive. A
regulation that spreads burdensome effects over a relatively
large percentage of the population should be considered more
comprehensive. Such a regulation is less likely to reflect the
singling out of individuals for burdens, cause unrestrained
exuberance of regulators, fail to harmonize competing uses of
property, or threaten investors.
Judged by these two considerations, the New York City
law was less comprehensive than the Court's opinion made it
appear. First, the flexibility of the governing criteria in the
New York law made this factor less supportive of the Court's
decision than the Court recognized. Criteria regarding
historical significance are notoriously likely to prove elusive.
Contemporary battles about the site of a New York mosque6
and over school textbooks for social studies classes161 make
this conclusion inescapable. Perhaps for this reason, the
Penn Central opinion emphasized not the vagueness or
specificity of the criteria that the Preservation Commission
might have used, but the availability of judicial review of the
Commission's decision. This argument bordered on the
disingenuous, because judicial review of a land use decision is
preformed under a rational basis standard, in which
any plausible reason for the decision is sufficient.162 This
160. A recent and well publicized controversy involving plans to construct a
mosque near the site of the attacks of September 11, 2001, on the World Trade
Center in New York illustrates this point. Opponents hoped that New York's
Landmarks Preservation Commission, the same body featured in Penn Central,
would classify the relevant structures as a landmark, and they further hoped
that such a designation would discourage plans for the mosque, which they
opposed on the ground that it would detract from the significance of the site of
the attacks. To make their case to the Commissioner, opponents advanced
reasons for regarding the buildings as historic and distinctive. The commission
ultimately decided, however, that the buildings were not "distinctive enough."
To underscore the flexibility of the criteria, an advocacy group immediately
announced that it would file suit to challenge the decision. See Karen Matthews
& Beth Fouby, New York City Panel Clears Way for Mosque Near Ground Zero,
HOuS. CHRON., Aug. 4, 2010, at A6.
161. Arguments in Texas during 2010 about standards for textbooks for
public schools produced bitter battles over treatment in history books of racism,
religion, free enterprise, and individual historical figures. See Gary Scharrer,
Divided Board Makes Curriculum History, HouS. CHRON., May 22, 2010, at Al.
162. See Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 389 (upholding zoning that is not
"arbitrary"); Anderson v. City of Wheeling, 149 S.E.2d 243, 249 (W. Va. 1966)
(upholding zoning that is "fairly debatable").
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standard is appropriate, but it does not suffice to provide
specificity to vague guidelines that are used by the deciding
authority. Among most of the 400-plus properties that New
York had designated as landmarks, a decision to remove the
property from regulation, or to include another property,
could be readily supported by plausible arguments about
historical interest.163  So could a decision to quadruple the
list of properties, or to cut it in half. The Court would have
come closer to the meaning of the Fifth Amendment if it had
based its decision on the ambiguity of the criteria actually
used by the Commission.
Second, the regulatory regime adversely affected only a
tiny percentage of the relevant population. The Court
avoided coming to grips with this issue by considering only
the absolute number of affected properties: over 400
properties in 31 districts."6 The dissent points out that the
absolute value of 400 properties was a miniscule fraction of
the relevant population of property owners, given the number
of structures in New York City, which was over one million.
165
The likelihood of the effects that the Takings Clause is
intended to prevent was more significant in Penn Central
than the Court made it appear. The comprehensiveness and
reciprocity of advantage factors are significant and the
Court's treatment of them, as such, was appropriate. But an
evaluation of these factors should be based on ambiguity in
the regulatory regime and upon concentration of the effects
on a relatively small minority, both of which are
characteristics that undermine the Court's arguments against
finding a taking. The majority of the Court failed to give
these characteristics of the New York law their due
significance.
D. Minor Factors: Uniquely Public Functions and Obnoxious
Uses
Finally, there are two balancing factors that seem
unlikely to be helpful in most cases but that might have
places in some kinds of situations. The Court recognized that
takings often are to be found from "government actions that
163. See supra note 160 (containing an example where the Commission
simply decided that the structures in question were not sufficiently distinctive).
164. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 134.
165. See id. at 138 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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may be characterized as acquisitions of resources to permit or
facilitate uniquely public functions. 166 The Court also
observed that the finding of a taking could be avoided when
government was forced to "make a choice between the
preservation of one class of property and that of the other. "167
The first of these factors might be called the "uniquely public
function" element. The second can be characterized as the
"noxious use" factor, because it arises from two types of
property that are inconsistent with each other, and the
property that can most readily be characterized as noxious
will usually become the object of adverse governmental
action.
Most of the time, the uniquely-public-function element is
unhelpful because all regulations, by definition, are intended
to advance some kind of public purpose. The case that the
Supreme Court used to illustrate this factor certainly is not
readily recognizable as one in which the government had
"acqui[red] resources for uniquely public functions," any more
than any case involving regulation. 16 The case the Court
cited resulted in the finding of a taking from the
government's creation of an airport that caused noisy over-
flights of the claimant's land that destroyed the claimant's
use of the land for livestock.1 69 Perhaps one can say that the
act of developing an airport that results in the emission of
noise above private land is somehow an acquisition of
airspace to carry out a uniquely public function, this
characterization proceeds from an unnatural reading of
phrases such as "acquisition" and "uniquely public function."
The real point is that it is hard to use these words to
distinguish takings from non-takings, and this is the object of
the inquiry. Especially since the government's regulation in
Penn Central itself involved the government's extension of its
policies into the property owner's airspace. Did New York
City then "acquire" the airspace above Grand Central Station
to carry out a "uniquely public function," namely, the public
function of preserving the view, or providing light and air?
Then the uniquely-public-function factor seems useless in
most cases, including Causby itself, even though the Court
166. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 128.
167. Id. at 126.
168. Causby, 328 U.S. at 256, cited in Id. at 128.
169. Causby, 328 U.S. at 267.
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used Causby as authority for the uniquely-public-function
factor. Perhaps some utility for the factor can be salvaged by
an interpretation that emphasizes that the uniquely public
functions that matter are most likely to be traditionally
recognized government activities. Therefore, the acquisition
of a building for a post office or of land for a military base
might fit this criterion, although in such cases, takings are
likely already to be unmistakable.
The Court illustrated the noxious use element by Miller
v. Schoene,17° in which the state government required
property owners to cut down ornamental cedar trees because
they produced cedar rust that destroyed nearby apple trees.
The Court held that this governmental action was not a
taking because it reflected "a choice between the preservation
of one class of property and that of [another]."' In such a
case, it is a matter of taste to decide which property is the
"noxious" one, and this may be an argument against the
usefulness of the factor. In situations in which one of two
properties must disappear, the choice is necessary, and the
characterization of the disadvantaged property as the noxious
one is beside the point.
Ironically, this noxious-use factor might reverse one of
the Court's holdings that seems at first blush to be solidly
reasoned, if the factor were properly applied. In Hodel v.
Irving, the Indian Land Consolidation Act required the
escheat to the tribe of any interest in Indian-territory land of
less than two percent.'72 Inheritance and similar diffusions of
Indian lands had resulted in small parcels that were owned
by so many different people in such small proportions
that transfer or even development was impractical.'7 3 One
example was a parcel that earned $1080 in annual rent but
had 439 owners, one-third of whom received less than 5¢ a
year: an amount that presumably could not be accounted for
or paid at a cost less than the amount itself.174 In such a
situation, these virtually valueless interests undermined the
best use of property and destroyed value in the larger
interests, because it was impractical to convey or use a
170. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
171. Id. at 279.
172. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 721-22 (1987).
173. Id. at 707.
174. Id. at 713.
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property with so many owners who had so little inherent
value. The Court recognized that most factors militated
against a taking, including the broad public purpose,
investment-backed expectations, and comprehensiveness or
reciprocity-of-advantage factors.'75 But it held that there was
a taking, because the Act destroyed all value in the interests
of those who earned less than five cents a year. 176 If the
Court had emphasized the noxious-use factor and had
recognized that the Act reflected a choice between
preservation of one class of property (the meaningful
interests) or another (the meaningless interests), it might
have decided the case the other way.177
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has set up an ad hoc balancing test
as the general method of recognizing takings under the Fifth
Amendment. The Court has created some formal rules for so-
called per se takings, and these rules probably produce
greater consistency and predictability in the cases to which
they apply, but the general approach toward recognizing
takings remains a highly instrumentalist regime guided
primarily by policy, with few formal guidelines. This kind of
approach means that the rules are loose, the jurisprudence is
susceptible to idiosyncratic preferences of individual judges,
and connection to the purposes of the Fifth Amendment easily
can be lost. An ad hoc balancing test may be the best that the
Court can do in a situation in which the problems arise in
such a wide variety, as they do for takings claims. It becomes
particularly important for the balancing factors to reflect the
policies that underlie the Fifth Amendment. Interpretation of
the factors in the Supreme Court's framework as announced
in its Penn Central decision, then, is an important issue.
The policies underlying the Takings Clause are
controversial, but the original intent surely must have
included both deontological (right-and-wrong-based) and
consequentialist (economic) policies. Deontologically, the
Takings Clause prevents government from engaging in the
175. Id. at 714.
176. Id. at 717-18.
177. Cf. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 156 (invalidating the escheat of interest
amounts on accounts so small that the interest they generated was less than the
costs of accounting for and paying it).
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ethically wrong practice of sacrificing individuals to the
greater good, by having them bear losses that should be borne
by the public at large. In consequentialist terms, the Clause
carries out economic purposes; it restrains the exuberance of
government regulators, harmonizes competing uses of
property, and encourages investment. These are the policies
to which the Penn Central framework of balancing
factors should be directed. Unfortunately, however, the
identification and description of the factors in Penn Central
are too indefinite to carry out these policies reliably. The
Penn Central factors can be characterized as six in number
(or possibly seven, depending upon one's classificatory
scheme), and the work of this Article is to describe better how
the courts should weigh these six (or seven) balancing factors.
There is at least one false factor, a factor that should not
have been part of the Court's list: broad public purpose. A
broad public purpose does not indicate the absence of a
taking; just as often, or perhaps more often, it indicates that
political power has been exercised on behalf of a large
majority to subject the property of an individual to public use.
In other words, this factor is a poor guide to the task at issue.
A broad public purpose often will signify that political power
is being used to sacrifice individuals to the common good and
support by a majority that is benefited by a particular kind of
regulation seems unlikely to restrain exuberant regulators,
harmonize competing uses of property, or encourage
investment. Since it is part of a pronouncement of the
Supreme Court, the broad public purpose factor has to be
taken seriously. It should be afforded little weight in most ad
hoc balancing cases, however, to reflect the Court's opposing
pronouncement that the breadth of the public purpose
becomes less significant when regulation goes "too far." The
real question, then, becomes whether the regulation goes too
far, rather than whether there is a broad public purpose; and
this question can better be answered by other considerations.
A second factor, physical invasion by government action,
is obsolete, because after Penn Central, the Court has
recognized physical occupation as creating per se takings. In
such cases, the applicable approach does not involve
balancing factors at all. Perhaps this physical-invasion factor
retains some utility in a few cases in which the real question
is whether the government's action is properly characterized
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as a physical invasion. The factor then reduces to a
consideration of the extent to which the government's action
resembles a physical invasion. In these cases, perhaps the
physical invasion factor can be helpful in carrying out the
policies of the Takings Clause, as it arguably is when used in
the per se cases.
A third factor, the economic impact of the regulation on
the claimant, should be given significant weight. The Court
explains this factor as particularly referring to "the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations." This qualification is helpful, because it
describes the kind of case in which singling out of individuals
for public burdens, concern for regulatory exuberance,
competing uses of property, and discouragement of
investment might become most significant. But some of the
words in the qualification may be misleading. The courts
should not interpret "expectations" as referring to certain or
quantifiable calculations of a mathematical variety.
Expectation, in the form of a generalized prediction that a
particular investment is likely to be profitable, should be
enough. Similarly, it should not matter that the original
investment was made years before, or by someone else, so
that the current situation involves property more valuable
than might have been predicted. Courts easily can accept
misinterpretations of these kinds. The tendency to limit a
property owner's return to a "reasonable" amount (as defined
by a judge, based on historical factors), rather than viewing
the property according to its value, is an easy fallacy that
contradicts the purposes of the Takings Clause. The
economic impact factor should show solicitude for investment-
backed expectations, but it should view the impact according
to the value of the affected property, not by reconstruction of
historical impressions about what was or could have been, or
might have been expected.
A fourth factor is the comprehensiveness of the
regulatory scheme, and this too is an important factor. If the
regulation spreads its disadvantages by a broadly applicable
plan, it is less likely to result in the singling out of the few for
sacrifice to the many. Similarly, breadth of application
among the public is likely to restrain regulatory exuberance,
harmonize competing uses, and encourage investment,
because by definition it reflects the individual members'
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decision, within the democratic majority, to impose regulation
upon themselves. The idea of a reciprocity of advantage can
be treated as a separate factor, or it can be treated as a
corollary of the comprehensiveness factor. A regulation that
creates reciprocity of advantage to all to whom it applies is
likely to avoid singling out a few individuals, to restrain
regulatory excesses, to harmonize competing uses, and to
encourage investment.
The fifth and sixth factors are likely to be useful only in
limited cases. Acquisition for uniquely public functions is not
normally likely to furnish a good guideline, because all
regulation is intended to produce some sort of public benefit.
The Supreme Court's example of this factor, in which a taking
was found, is difficult to distinguish on public functions
grounds from Penn Central itself, in which the Court held the
opposite: that there was no taking. Perhaps some utility can
emerge in the public function factor if it is viewed in terms of
regulatory actions that assist in traditional governmental
functions. The sixth factor, noxious use, is likewise of lesser
application. This factor is best characterized as indicating
against a taking when the government is forced to make "a
choice between the preservation of one class of property and
that of [another]." In such a case, the singling out of some
individuals is based upon the justifiable premise that
otherwise, other equally vulnerable individuals would be
singled out, regulatory exuberance is not present because the
government's decision is forced, harmonizing of competing
uses is precisely what is occurring, and government cannot in
any event encourage investment by attempting to avoid a
necessary choice.
The mushy character of the Penn Central balancing
factors may ultimately become irreducible after a short course
of refinement. It is there because a balancing test is probably
the best option, and balancing inherently involves more or
less mushiness. But the mushiness can be minimized, if not
eliminated, by careful definition of the balancing factors, and
this kind of refinement can make the balancing test carry out
its purposes better. The examination of the balancing factors
undertaken here is intended to produce these results.
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